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Cell Phone Location Tracking: Reforming the 
Standard to Reflect Modern Privacy Expectations 
INTRODUCTION 
If you are like most cell phone users today, chances are, your cell 
phone is within arm’s reach of you as you read this article. Ninety-one 
percent of American adults own cell phones, and nearly two-thirds of that 
group own smartphones, which are cell phones with computer operating 
systems.1 Many cell phone users are almost never without their phones 
during the waking day.2 Even while sleeping, most users keep their cell 
phones near them and usually charge their phones on a bedside table. 
Immediately after waking, most cell phone users reach for their cell 
phones before doing anything else.3 The International Data Corporation’s 
(“IDC”) research revealed that 63% of smartphone owners keep their 
phones with them for all but one hour of the day, and 79% keep their 
smartphones with them for all but two hours of the day.4 The research also 
showed that one in four respondents could not recall a time in the day when 
the phones were not within reach or in the same room.5 
As these statistics demonstrate, cell phones have transformed the way 
society communicates, conducts business, organizes daily affairs, and 
connects with others throughout the world.6 In modern American 
society—a society accustomed to having the ability to be in constant 
contact with anyone, anytime, anywhere—the cell phone has become a 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by SHANNON JAECKEL. 
 1. Always Connected: How Smartphones and Social Keep Us Engaged, INT’L 
DATA CORP., http://www.nu.nl/files/IDC-Facebook%20Always%20Connected% 
20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/9AXV-BWRU] (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) [hereinafter 
Always Connected]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Research surveying American adult smartphone owners showed that within 
the first 15 minutes of waking up, four out of five users check their phones, and 
among these people 80% reach for their phones before doing anything else. Id.  
 4. Id. The IDC surveyed 7,446 American smartphone users between the ages 
of 18 and 44 over the course of one week to produce this research. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. See also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based 
Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 18–19 
(2010) (testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings 
/printers/111th/111-109_57082.PDF [https://perma.cc/2JWD-ZB9B] [hereinafter 
ECPA Reform].  
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critical social, communication, and information tool.7 Cell phones today 
are not a mere convenience; they are a basic necessity to many Americans 
and omnipresent in nearly all aspects of life.8 
Society is able to stay connected because of recent developments in 
cellular technology, but with this convenience comes a significant 
drawback. Law enforcement can use cell phones to track individual’s 
movements with greater ease. Cell phones automatically register their 
location with cell phone towers every seven seconds,9 and users cannot 
deactivate this function while the phone is powered on.10 Each time a cell 
phone connects to a cell tower, cell site location information (“CSLI”) data 
is generated.11 This information is capable of reconstructing a cell phone 
user’s specific movements minute by minute.12 Cell service providers 
store CSLI in cell tower records, often for several years.13 Each year law 
enforcement agencies submit millions of requests to cell service providers 
for cell tower records, usually without a warrant.14 To accommodate the 
large volume of data requests they receive, some cell service providers 
have created detailed handbooks describing their policies for surveillance 
assistance for law enforcement agents.15 Sprint has even created a website 
                                                                                                             
 7. Always Connected, supra note 1. 
 8. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 18–19. 
 9. Scott A. Fraser, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New 
Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 571, 578 (2012). 
 10. Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-records-request 
[https://perma.cc/2U54-JN6D] (last updated Mar. 25, 2013). 
 11. See Nathaniel Wackman, Historical Cellular Location Information and 
the Fourth Amendment, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 263, 269 (2015). 
 12. R. Craig Curtis, Michael C. Gizzi & Michael J. Kittleson, Using 
Technology the Founders Never Dreamed of: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices 
and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 75 (2014). 
 13. Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Site Location 
Information: What Should We Do While We Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. 
L. REV. 215, 217 (2015). According to the United States Department of Justice, 
Sprint keeps location tracking records for 18–24 months, and AT&T has stored 
cell tower records “since July 2008,” suggesting they are stored indefinitely. Cell 
Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra note 10. 
 14. Curtis, supra note 12, at 62–63. 
 15. Catherine Crump, Are the Police Tracking Your Calls?, CNN (May 22, 
2012 3:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/22/opinion/crump-cellphone-
privacy [https://perma.cc/AER8-S36Z]. 
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for police to access the information conveniently with the simple click of 
a mouse.16 
Although police commonly use these convenient practices, no uniform 
legal standard for judicial oversight exists.17 The current laws governing 
CSLI in Louisiana and elsewhere are unclear and the laws fail to balance 
properly the government’s interest in executing investigations with the 
competing privacy interests in location information. Requiring law 
enforcement to demonstrate probable cause that CSLI will reveal evidence 
of a crime and to obtain a warrant before gathering CSLI would effectively 
balance these interests and provide clear guidelines for law enforcement. 
Both the Louisiana Constitution and the Louisiana statutes governing 
CSLI should adopt this standard. Louisiana courts should recognize the 
privacy right in CSLI under Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana 
Constitution,18 and the Louisiana legislature should enact a comprehensive 
statutory scheme that sets forth clear guidelines governing all areas of 
CSLI. Those guidelines should include exclusionary remedies and 
exceptions to the warrant requirement so that both the courts and law 
enforcement have a definitive set of rules to resolve CSLI issues. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of CSLI technology and 
the relevant federal statutes. This section explains the mechanics and 
content of CSLI data; additionally, it illustrates recent advances in CSLI 
technology and the importance of this information to law enforcement. 
Part II analyzes the three most recent federal circuit court decisions in this 
area of the law. These cases identify the analytical problems surrounding 
CSLI and illustrate the extent to which courts have addressed these 
problems. Part III examines state responses to CSLI with a particular focus 
on how Louisiana courts and the Louisiana legislature have approached 
the issue in comparison with other states. Part IV proposes that the 
Louisiana legislature be proactive in adopting a comprehensive CSLI 
statutory scheme rather than waiting for federal action. Specifically, the 
courts should interpret the Louisiana Constitution more expansively to 
provide additional privacy interest protections than currently exist under 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. 
 17. Curtis, supra note 12, at 63. 
 18. The Louisiana Constitution provides: 
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or 
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose 
or reason for the search. 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
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federal law, and the Louisiana legislature should codify this privacy 
interest and provide detailed guidelines. This solution is most apt to 
resolve the problems surrounding Louisiana for two reasons. First, it will 
vest a constitutionally protected interest. Second, it allows the Louisiana 
legislature, which is charged with adopting policies that benefit its 
citizenry, to adopt legislative rules that balance the government’s interest 
in conducting effective investigations with the public’s privacy interests 
in CSLI. 
I. MODERN CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING 
Smartphones have created more detailed and advanced CSLI.19 Law 
enforcement agencies routinely utilize CSLI during investigations, and 
prosecutors commonly introduce CSLI as evidence in courtrooms.20 As a 
result, judges and juries frequently rely on CSLI to convict criminal 
defendants.21 Both the technology of CSLI and the laws controlling the 
government’s use of CSLI illustrate why it has been an extraordinary tool 
to the government. 
A. Cell Site Location Information and Cell Tower Technology 
CTIA’s Annual Wireless Industry Survey reveals that wireless 
subscribers in the United States used 2.88 trillion voice minutes, 9.65 
trillion megabytes of data, and sent 1.89 trillion text messages in 2015.22 
Each of these connections that the wireless devices made to cell towers 
generated CSLI, which the cell service provider later stored. Occasionally, 
the government accessed CSLI without the wireless subscriber’s 
knowledge, and in many cases without a warrant based on a showing of 
probable cause. The popularity of cell phones and the plethora of purposes 
for which they are used today create trillions of location data points each 
year.23 The advancement of cellular technology coupled with the 
                                                                                                             
 19. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(explaining how smartphones communicate with the network more frequently 
than traditional cell phones). 
 20. See, e.g., Graham, 796 F.3d at 332; see also State v. Marinello 49 So. 3d 
488 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Undisclosed: The State vs. Adnan Syed: Ping, PARTNERS IN 
CRIME MEDIA (July 27, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes).  
 22. Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-
life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey [https://perma.cc/7HPT-B 
YB6] (last updated May 2016). 
 23. See id. 
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proliferation of cell sites has led to voluminous, detailed, and precise cell 
tower records that the government has used to its advantage in both 
investigative and prosecutorial contexts. 
1. The Mechanics of CSLI  
To function, a cell phone constantly connects to a cellular network by 
communicating with cell sites in its immediate area.24 These communications 
occur when the phone sends or receives a call or text message.25 Smartphones 
generate more frequent communications with the network through 
applications installed on the phone.26 For example, each time the smartphone 
updates an email inbox,27 shares pictures on social media, or provides 
navigation data, the smartphone connects to the network.28 Cell sites, or 
cell towers, are radio base stations that cellular service providers maintain 
throughout their geographic coverage areas.29 A registration process 
determines the particular cell site responsible for connecting the cell phone 
to the network.30 As a cell phone moves throughout the coverage area, it 
will periodically identify itself to cell towers within its vicinity.31 Once the 
cell phone has located nearby cell towers, the phone ranks these towers 
according to the strength of the signal32 and registers with the cell tower 
best equipped to process a call through its radio signal’s strength.33 The 
registration process occurs continuously and automatically while the 
phone is turned on.34 When a phone moves away from the originating cell 
site during a call, the call is “handed off” to a new tower.35 When a cell 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 40 (2010) (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hear 
ings/printers/111th/111-98_56271.PDF [https://perma.cc/AR46-7MY8]; Graham, 
796 F.3d at 343; ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 20. 
 25. Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 20. 
 26. Graham, 796 F.3d at 343 n.1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (April 1, 
2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/NVE4-B49R]. 
 29. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 20. 
 30. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 578. 
 31. See ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 20. 
 32. Fraser, supra note 9, at 578. 
 33. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 13. 
 34. Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location 
Tracking: Where are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 421, 426 (2007). 
 35. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 20; Undisclosed, supra note 21. 
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phone is turned on and moving throughout the network, the cell service 
provider tracks the tower with which the phone is registered.36 Cell phone 
companies record this information in cell tower records for a variety of 
business purposes.37 
Cell tower records contain detailed information such as the date and 
time of calls made or received, the phone numbers called, the duration of 
each call, and the cell towers that began and ended the call.38 The amount 
of information that each cell service provider stores varies depending on a 
cell service provider’s technology and business decisions about data 
retention.39 Although some cell service providers limit cell tower record 
information to the data created during the beginning and the end of a call, 
other providers store all of the data, including location information 
collected during a call and when the phone is idle.40 The length of time 
that cell service providers store CSLI also varies.41 An increasing number 
of cell service providers are opting to maintain more detailed cell tower 
records.42 The trend toward detailed cell tower records will likely continue 
because once a cell tower is installed, the cost of collecting and storing 
detailed, frequently updated cell tower records is relatively low.43 
                                                                                                             
 36. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 14. 
 37. Reforming the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (Statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media /doc/09-16-
15%20Tyrangiel%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EPC-4HRL] [hereinafter 
Reforming the ECPA]. Some of the business purposes that CSLI serves include 
establishing a communications channel, routing a communication to its intended 
destination, and billing customers for communications services. Id. 
 38. Mark Hansen, Prosecutors’ Use of Mobile Phone Tracking is ‘Junk Science,’ 
Critics Say , AM.  B.  ASSOC.  J. (June 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/article/prosecutors_use_of_mobile_phone_tracking_ 
is_junk_science_critics_say/ [https://perma.cc/7EXQ-KD42].                        .    
 39. Fraser, supra note 9, at 579. 
 40. See id. at 580; see also ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
 41. According to the United States Department of Justice, Sprint keeps 
location tracking records for 18 to 24 months, and AT&T has stored cell tower 
records “since July 2008,” which suggests that they are stored indefinitely. Cell 
Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra note 10. 
 42. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 27–28. Maintaining high resolution CSLI 
about each customer is a cost efficient way for cell service providers to collect 
highly valuable information for network management, marketing, and developing 
new services. Id.  
 43. Id. 
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Cell service providers are also continually building new cell towers to 
accommodate the explosive consumer demand for cellular service.44 As 
the number of cell towers steadily increases, the geographic area served 
by each cell tower decreases.45 Several years ago CSLI could provide only 
a vague picture of a person’s location.46 Presently, however, smaller cell 
coverage areas allow for collection of more precise location information.47 
Although some of the largest cell coverage areas in rural locales can still 
be several miles in diameter, modern technology provides much more 
specific locations, such as a floor or individual room in a building or 
private home.48 
2. The Use of CSLI by Law Enforcement 
As cell service providers deploy more advanced location technologies, 
law enforcement will receive more precise and more valuable CSLI.49 Law 
enforcement commonly uses this information to track individuals.50 
Additionally, although law enforcement commonly obtains cell phone 
records about a particular person, law enforcement sometimes requests 
data for all phones connected to a particular tower at a particular time.51 In 
response to a record request that the American Civil Liberties Union 
submitted to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the 
country regarding cell phone tracking, approximately 250 police 
departments responded with 2,700 pages of documents.52 The responses 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 19. The number of cell sites in the United States has increased from 
162,986 in December 2003 to 298,055 in December 2014. Annual Wireless 
Industry Survey, supra note 22. 
 45. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 25. 
 46. Wackman, supra note 11, at 271. 
 47. See id. 
 48. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
 49. See id. at 29. 
 50. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra note 10. 
 51. Id. The investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing provides an 
example of this practice. Using processes outlined in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, FBI agents requested all CSLI generated for calls 
and texts terminated at the bombsite around the time that the bombs were 
detonated. Reforming the ECPA, supra note 37, at 3. These cell tower records 
later proved to be critical during the investigation to help identify the bombers 
and their associates. Id. Some of the cell tower records were used at trial to show 
the communications between the bombers at critical times. Id. 
 52. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra note 10. 
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revealed that although almost all of the police departments track cell 
phones, very few reported consistently obtaining warrants.53 
CSLI provides law enforcement with a priceless investigative tool 
because many law enforcement agencies located in areas employing 
advanced cellular technologies are able to calculate cell phone users’ 
locations with a precision that approaches that of a GPS.54 In fact, CSLI is 
often more useful to law enforcement than even traditional GPS devices 
for several reasons.55 First, CSLI yields some of the same results as 
physical surveillance, but CSLI obviates purchasing GPS devices and 
paying police officers for their time spent installing and subsequently 
removing GPS devices. Thus, police departments that lack the resources 
for extended GPS surveillance benefit from CSLI.56 Second, the cellular 
network produces CSLI without any indication to individuals that they are 
being tracked,57 whereas GPS devices, if discovered by the individual 
being tracked, would alert the individual to surveillance efforts. Lastly, 
CSLI allows law enforcement to track individuals in areas inaccessible to 
GPS devices without a warrant because of their constitutionally protected 
status, such as inside a home.58 Because cell phones have become such a 
ubiquitous part of modern American life, cell phones accompany their 
users everywhere,59 resulting in virtually constant surveillance in both 
private and public spaces.60 GPS devices, on the other hand, attach to 
specific areas or items, such as a car or container, that do not remain with 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. 
 54. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 23; M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as 
Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2007). A Global Positioning 
System (“GPS”) processes signals broadcasted by satellites orbiting the earth to 
mathematically determine the location of the GPS device and permits continuous, 
precise tracking of an individual’s movements. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking 
Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s 
Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 
662, 665 (2005). 
 55. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 30. 
 56. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: 
The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
383, 408 (1997). 
 57. Id. 
 58. ECPA Reform, supra note 6, at 30. 
 59. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013) (“[C]ell-phone use has 
become an indispensable part of modern life. The hundreds of millions of wireless 
devices in use each day can often be found near their owners—at work, school, or 
home, and at events and gatherings of all types.”). 
 60. Graham, 796 F.3d at 348. 
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individuals as continuously as a cell phone does, thus limiting the 
availability of location information collected by the GPS devices.61 
Examination of cell tower records not only helps law enforcement 
officials locate suspects,62 but also reveals with whom a suspect 
communicates, at what time, and for how long.63 Officers gather CSLI 
early in investigations and use it to generate at least part of the probable 
cause justification necessary for subsequent search and arrest warrants.64 
In the past several years, location data has provided law enforcement 
with not only investigatory but also prosecutorial value.65 Lawyers can use 
CSLI to achieve many evidentiary objectives during trial, including 
destroying a suspect’s alibi and establishing presence near a crime scene 
at the approximate time of the crime.66 Because establishing a defendant’s 
location during the crime is often one of the most important factors to a 
jury, prosecutors supplement traditional defendant location evidence, such 
as eyewitness testimony and physical evidence, with cell site analysis from 
CSLI to connect defendants with places relevant to the charged offense.67 
Prosecutors use inferences from even fairly imprecise CSLI as key 
evidence to enhance the value of the data in the jury’s eyes.68 
                                                                                                             
 61. See id. 
 62. An example of law enforcement using CSLI to locate a suspect is the shooting 
of a police lieutenant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of 
James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo 
/media/doc/11-4-6%20Baker%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP38-QS83]. While 
attempting to stop the suspect, the suspect shot the lieutenant in the neck and fled the 
scene. Id. After investigation, the suspect was identified and an arrest warrant was 
obtained for attempted first-degree murder of a police officer. Id. In their efforts to locate 
and arrest the suspect, the officers obtained court orders compelling the suspect’s cell 
phone company to provide cell tower records. Id. The CSLI ultimately allowed officers 
to confirm the suspect’s location. Id. 
 63. Fraser, supra note 9, at 582. 
 64. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra note 
10, at 2. 
 65. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: 
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 725 (2011). 
 66. Wackman, supra note 11, at 267. 
 67. Thomas A. O’Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, 59 U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 6, 16 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P2K-SS2V]. 
 68. Freiwald, supra note 65, at 725–26. 
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One example of a prosecutor relying heavily on unreliable CSLI to 
convict a defendant comes from State v. Adnan Syed.69 In 2000, Syed was 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for killing his ex-
girlfriend.70 The state used cell tower data to link Syed to Leakin Park, 
where the body was found.71 The prosecution had no physical evidence or 
eyewitnesses tying Syed to the murder.72 The only non-CSLI evidence that 
the prosecution presented was the testimony of a friend, Jay Wilds,73 
which was also unreliable because Wilds changed his story to match the 
cell tower records after the police confronted him with the records.74 
Although either piece of evidence alone would not likely have been 
sufficient to prove Syed’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutors 
aggressively and successfully asserted that the cell tower records 
corroborated Wilds’s story.75 The CSLI available during Syed’s trial was 
far less precise than the CSLI available today, but it was sufficient to 
convince the jury of Syed’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The precision 
of CSLI and the frequency of cell phone use today as compared to in 2000 
has changed drastically, and as a result, so has the need for protection of 
privacy interests in location information. 
B. Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”) in 1986 to expand and revise federal wiretapping and electronic 
eavesdropping laws.76 Congress sought not only to “create a fair balance 
between the privacy expectations of citizens and the legitimate needs of 
law enforcement,” but also to “support the creation of new technologies 
by assuring consumers that their personal information would remain 
                                                                                                             
 69. See generally Undisclosed, supra note 21. 
 70. Justin Fenton, Adnan Syed’s Defense Attorney Says He Has New Evidence to 
Overturn Conviction, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:27 PM), http://www 
.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-syed-cell-phone-motion-
20150824-story.html [https://perma.cc/B4XF-H725]. 
 71. Id.; see also Undisclosed, supra note 21. 
 72. Fenton, supra note 70. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Undisclosed, supra note 21. 
 75. Id. For further discussion of the cell phone data controversy that the 
podcasts Undisclosed: The State vs. Adnan Syed and season one of Serial reveal, 
see The Legal Ease: Ep. 6 Hon James Dennis: Personal History Part 2, LA. L. 
REV. (Feb. 21, 2016) (downloaded using iTunes). 
 76. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org 
/privacy/ecpa/ [https://perma.cc/66UJ-9EK5] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
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safe.”77 The ECPA consists of several sets of laws governing the collection 
and disclosure of both content and non-content information related to 
electronic communications,78 including the Pen Register Statute79 
controlling real-time CSLI and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)80 
controlling historical CSLI. The ECPA was originally enacted during a 
considerably different technological era.81 Although Congress has updated 
the ECPA several times, the statute—particularly the SCA provisions 
controlling disclosure of cell tower records—has failed to keep pace with 
changes in cellular technology and the way it is used.82 
The primary statute that governs the disclosure of historical CSLI is 
the SCA.83 Historical CSLI reveals data generated during past cell phone 
connections to cell towers.84 Barring subscriber consent, the statute 
requires the government to obtain a warrant or a court order before 
compelling disclosure of historical CSLI.85 A warrant authorizing 
disclosure requires an impartial magistrate to find probable cause.86 
Section 2703(d) mandates that a court of competent jurisdiction issue a 
court order for disclosure “only if the governmental entity offers specific 
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the . . . records . . . sought are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”87 The Section 2703(d) standard requiring specific 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. 
 78. CSLI is generally considered to be non-content information because it 
involves the numbers used to make calls, the duration of calls, and which cell 
towers were used to make those calls, rather than the actual words communicated 
through the call. Corbett, supra note 13, at 218. Therefore, content-based 
electronic communications are outside the scope of this article. 
 79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).  
 81. Reforming the ECPA, supra note 37, at 4. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 84. Corbett, supra note 13. 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). 
 86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d). The warrant requirements in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
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and articulable facts is essentially a reasonable suspicion standard.88 The 
probable cause standard for securing a warrant is substantially higher than 
the specific and articulable facts standard required for a Section 2703 court 
order.89 Although the probable cause standard requires that the information 
sought be evidence of a crime,90 the Section 2703(d) standard allows the 
government to seek any information that is materially relevant to an 
ongoing investigation.91 The Section 2703(d) standard thus permits 
acquisition of CSLI that will yield not necessarily evidence of a crime but 
rather information that will somehow aid in the investigation of a crime,92 
which permits broader inquiries into a wider range of targets.93 
Despite the significant disparities in the level of proof required for a 
warrant versus a Section 2703(d) order, Section 2703 offers no express 
direction about when the government should seek a warrant as opposed to 
an order.94 Although the sealed nature of the government’s requests makes 
knowing the full scope of such inquiries impossible, the lesser standard 
and anecdotal evidence suggest that the Section 2703(d) standard has 
facilitated much more information gathering than the probable cause 
standard would permit.95 The statute’s lack of clear guidance has sparked 
much debate over the proper standard of proof required to obtain CSLI 
under the SCA. 
Real-time CSLI is governed by 18 U.S.C. Section 3122, commonly 
known as the Pen Register or Trap and Trace Statute.96 Real-time CSLI 
shows cell phone connections to cell towers as they actually occur.97 The 
Pen Register statute also requires the government to obtain a court order 
before compelling disclosure of cell tower data. A Section 3122 court 
                                                                                                             
 88. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d at 343–44 (quoting In Re Application 
of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 287 
(4th Cir. 2013)). 
 89. Id. at 344. 
 90. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); see also In re Application of the U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 
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 91. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 92. Freiwald, supra note 65, at 697–98. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Graham, 796 F.3d at 343–44 (citations omitted) (quoting In Re 
Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 
283, 287 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 95. Freiwald, supra note 65, at 697–98. 
 96. Corbett, supra note 13, at 218. 
 97. Id. at 217. 
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order requires a “certification by the applicant that the information likely 
to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being 
conducted by that agency.”98 Thus, the standard for a Section 3122 court 
order is even lower than the Section 2703(d) standard in that, unlike the 
Section 2703(d) order, the applicant need not demonstrate specific and 
articulable facts demonstrating the real-time CSLI’s relevance to the 
investigation. 
The ECPA does not achieve the goals Congress intended in balancing 
the interest of the government in prosecution with the interest of the public 
in privacy. Both Section 2703(d) and Section 3122 provide the 
government with open avenues to obtain CSLI without a showing of 
probable cause and, thus, do not have restrictions necessary to prevent 
violations of privacy. Although the ECPA serves the needs of law 
enforcement by allowing almost unfettered access to CSLI during 
investigations, the ECPA fails to strike an appropriate balance between the 
needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of citizens. The 
significant inequities in this balancing equation have given rise to 
litigation that has sharply divided courts throughout the country.99 
II. THE CELLULAR CIRCUIT BOARD SPLIT 
Advances in cellular technology have forced courts to reconsider 
whether to follow the legal standards that governed individual privacy 
rights during a much earlier time or to alter them in light of the newest and 
most prevalent method of search—CSLI tracking.100 Current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence governing the search doctrine fails to consider new 
cellular technologies and thus does not provide guidance to lower 
courts.101 The United States courts of appeals, faced with the issue of what 
standard of proof should apply to obtain CSLI, have attempted to reconcile 
the rapidly evolving technological landscape with unsettled, 30-year-old 
Fourth Amendment precedent.102 Although each court has framed the issue 
by reference to the overarching question of whether individuals have a 
                                                                                                             
 98. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2012). 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 2015 WL 4600402 (U.S. 2015); see also Graham, 796 F.3d at 332. 
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legitimate privacy interest in location information, the courts’ differing 
conclusions have created a federal circuit split. 
A. Inside the Circuit Board: Fourth Amendment Precedent Controlling 
the Inquiry 
The CSLI analysis implicates multiple strands of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and courts have generally used two constitutional 
approaches—the third-party doctrine and the analogy to GPS tracking 
cases.103 Some courts use the third-party doctrine to justify government 
access to CSLI without a warrant.104 Other courts have focused on drawing 
comparisons to GPS tracking cases when formulating a stricter Fourth 
Amendment rationale to strike down government access to CSLI.105 
The two-pronged test established by Katz v. United States answers the 
overarching question of whether citizens have a privacy interest in their 
CSLI.106 In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the attachment of an 
eavesdropping device to a public phone booth, which recorded the 
defendant’s conversation, was a search under the Fourth Amendment.107 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence set forth the operative test used to answer the 
question of whether an activity constitutes a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.108 First, a person must have “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy” and, second, that expectation must be 
one that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”109 The Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test has been influential: it determined 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 318. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705 (1984); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). See also Wackmam, 
supra note 11, at 318. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)) (explaining that the third party doctrine 
applies to CSLI because the government asks cell service providers to turn over 
records that the provider has already created using CSLI collected); see also 
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2015 WL 
4600402 (U.S. 2015) (“The longstanding third-party doctrine plainly controls the 
disposition of this case.”). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 346–47 (comparing 
examination of historical CSLI to the GPS monitoring in Karo and Kyllo). 
 106. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 107. Id. at 353. 
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the outcome of landmark Supreme Court cases involving assisted 
surveillance and continues to guide Fourth Amendment search inquiries 
today.110 
1. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The federal circuits have reached different conclusions about whether 
the third-party doctrine, established in Smith v. Maryland,111 is applicable 
to CSLI.112 In Smith, law enforcement used a pen register device without 
a warrant to record phone numbers dialed by the suspect’s private 
phone.113 The Court held that no legitimate privacy expectation or Fourth 
Amendment protection existed in the record of phone numbers that a 
person dials.114 The Court reasoned that because the caller voluntarily 
provides the phone numbers dialed to the phone company, which keeps 
record of phone numbers in its normal course of business, the caller could 
claim no legitimate privacy expectation in that information.115 Thus, under 
the third-party doctrine, an individual maintains no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information that is voluntary disclosed to third parties.116 
Since Smith in 1979, however, technological advancements have 
raised doubts as to whether the third-party doctrine remains applicable. In 
United States v. Jones, the Court held that installation of a GPS device on 
a suspect’s car constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and 
required probable cause and a warrant.117 Although the majority opinion 
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
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 112. Compare In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site 
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S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)) (explaining that the 
third-party doctrine applies to CSLI because the government is asking cell service 
providers to produce records the provider has already created), and Davis, 785 
F.3d at 512 (“The longstanding third-party doctrine plainly controls the 
disposition of this case.”), with Graham, 796 F.3d at 353 (“It is clear to us . . . that 
cell phone users do not voluntarily convey their CSLI to their service providers. 
The third-party doctrine . . . is therefore inapplicable here.”). 
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relied primarily on the notion of trespass, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion focused on reasonable expectations of privacy.118 She noted that 
the third-party doctrine was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”119 
Justice Sotomayor also reasoned that a trespass analysis is not 
applicable in surveillance situations that involve the mere transmission of 
electronic signals.120 Instead, she emphasized the importance of reasonable 
expectations of privacy and how technological evolutions shape societal 
expectations.121 Justice Sotomayor analyzed particular attributes of GPS 
technology that are relevant to the Katz analysis, such as the ability of GPS 
to “generate[] a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”122 Justice Sotomayor also 
expressed concerns about the government’s ability to collect substantial 
amounts of private information about individuals at a low cost and with 
minimal restraints, which leads to police abuse.123 
This observation is particularly applicable in the CSLI context because 
in the past, the substantial government time and resource expenditures 
required for extensive tracking and monitoring operated as a check on 
abusive law enforcement practices. With the ease of electronic tracking 
and monitoring, however, these checks no longer exist.124 As Justice 
Sotomayor suggested, when applying the Katz analysis to electronic 
surveillance methods such as CSLI tracking, the more central Fourth 
Amendment issue should be “whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”125 Modern society expects these types of 
details to remain private, regardless of how or whether the information 
revealing these intimate details ultimately comes into a third party’s 
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 120. See id. at 955. 
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possession.126 Thus, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test might 
be the more appropriate doctrine to apply to CSLI because it is more suited 
for adaption to advancements in technology. 
2. The GPS Tracking Trilogy: Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo 
Three relevant Supreme Court cases involving technological surveillance 
further inform the CSLI inquiry: U.S. v. Knotts,127 U.S. v. Karo, 128 and Kyllo 
v. U.S.129 Knotts and Karo involved the installation of beepers inside chemical 
containers to track the defendants’ locations.130 In Knotts, the police used the 
beeper to follow the defendant on public roads to a remote cabin.131 The 
Court held that because the beeper simply enhanced law enforcement’s 
ability to follow the car while it was on public roads, where anyone can 
observe an individual, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his location on public streets.132 In Karo, the Court held that the 
monitoring of the beeper while the container was inside Karo’s private 
residence, where an individual does have a legitimate privacy expectation, 
would be a Fourth Amendment violation absent a warrant based on 
probable cause.133 The Court further explained that using an electronic 
device without a warrant to infer facts that visual surveillance could not 
reveal, such as whether a particular item is located inside a private 
residence or to confirm later that the item remains inside the residence, is 
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant.134 
The Court ruled that this type of location tracking “falls within the ambit 
of the Fourth Amendment when it reveals information that could not have 
been obtained through visual surveillance” from a public place, regardless 
of whether the tracking reveals information directly or through 
inference.135 
In Kyllo, the government used a thermal imaging device, classified as 
a tracking device, to determine whether the home was emitting a high level 
of heat, which is indicative of indoor marijuana cultivation.136 The 
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government then obtained a warrant based on the information they 
gathered from the thermal imagining device, which led to the discovery of 
a marijuana-growing operation inside the suspect’s house.137 Finding that the 
home is entitled to privacy protections, the Court held that when the 
government discovers details about the home’s inside that are unknowable via 
traditional visual surveillance through a device not in general public use, a 
Fourth Amendment search has occurred.138 The device did not reveal any 
private activities occurring inside the home, but this fact was unimportant to 
the Court’s determination because the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the 
home is not related to the quality or quantity of information discovered.139 The 
Court reasoned that limiting the prohibition on thermal imaging devices to 
only intimate details would result in an impractical and unworkable test.140 
Thus, the Court held that the details discovered were intimate because they 
revealed information about the activities inside the home, therefore entitling 
such information to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable 
searches.141 Although none of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
speaks directly to the issue of CSLI, courts have analogized the attributes 
of CSLI tracking to GPS monitoring. Because CSLI arguably shares some 
of the same attributes as a GPS device but simultaneously serves as third-
party record, the conclusions that the courts have reached vary. 
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Approach 
In In Re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 
federal authorities submitted a Section 2703(d) court order for CSLI in 
connection with three separate criminal investigations.142 The magistrate 
judge denied the request and held that historical CSLI required a 
warrant.143 The district court agreed.144 On appeal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the third-party doctrine, holding 
that CSLI is “clearly a business record” because “the cell service provider 
collects and stores historical cell site data for its own business 
purposes.”145 The court assumed not only that cell phone users understand 
that the mere use of a cell phone conveys location information to a service 
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provider, but also that they are aware that cell service providers retain this 
information and give it to law enforcement upon request.146 The court 
relied on cell phone users’ understanding that cell phones must send 
signals to cell towers to connect calls in support of its assumption that cell 
phone users necessarily know that location information is conveyed.147 
Lastly, the court stated that even if cell-phone-to-tower signal transmission 
was not common knowledge, the contractual terms of service and privacy 
policies notify users that a provider collects this information and will 
release these records to government officials if the provider receives a 
court order.148 
The Fifth Circuit drew several assumptions regarding the extent of cell 
phone user awareness relating to CSLI practices.149 A recent study that the 
Federal Trade Commission conducted, however, appears to contradict 
directly the assumptions upon which the Fifth Circuit relied in reaching its 
holding.150 The study revealed that most consumers are unaware of the 
extent of the data collection and storage occurring on their mobile 
devices.151 The study further revealed that when researchers alerted 
consumers to these practices, “consumers are typically surprised and view 
these practices as underhanded.”152 Studies have also shown that cell 
phone users often do not read or understand their providers’ privacy 
policies.153 Therefore, these research findings, which raise doubts about 
whether the public knows or has even considered cell phone providers’ 
practices,154 are inconsistent with the assumptions that the Fifth Circuit 
drew. 
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C. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach 
United States v. Davis involved an investigation of several armed 
robberies over a two-month period.155 After Davis’s arrest, the government 
applied to a federal magistrate judge for a Section 2703(d) court order.156 The 
magistrate judge’s order granted the request and the cell service provider 
complied.157 The prosecution later used the information gathered under the 
authority of this court order to argue that Davis was near the robbery 
locations when the robberies occurred.158 On rehearing, the en banc panel 
held that the Section 2703(d) court order did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the cell tower records.159 Adopting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, the court 
concluded that the third-party doctrine controlled the disposition of the 
case.160 The court applied the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test 
and held that even if Davis had a subjective expectation of privacy, the 
expectation was objectively unreasonable because there is no evidence that 
cell phone users are unaware of the functions of cell towers or the 
recordation of cell tower usage.161 
Noting the limited nature of Davis’s CSLI,162 the court stated that 
Davis’s CSLI was too imprecise to paint a detailed, accurate picture of his 
personal activities.163 Notably, however, the cell phone technology used in 
Davis was significantly older and less advanced than today’s technology.164 
Thus, whether the court would have reached the same result if the 
technology used in Davis were capable of generating more comprehensive 
and precise CSLI is questionable. The Davis court noted that Davis used an 
older cell phone, which provided no real-time tracking, no location data 
associated with his text messages, and no Wi-Fi-based location 
surveillance,165 even in the relatively urban area of South Florida.166 Had 
Davis been using the cellular technology that the majority of cell phone 
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users currently use—a smartphone—the CSLI released to law enforcement 
would likely have conveyed significantly more details of Davis’s personal 
life. Some commentators have suggested that in light of this distinction, the 
Davis ruling should not be read as justifying cell phone location tracking; 
rather, the ruling delayed the resolution of the question.167 Because the 
Eleventh Circuit decided Davis in 2015, the holding’s failure to consider law 
enforcement’s current utilization of CSLI is surprising. As a result, the Davis 
decision looks backward rather than forward because it applies to monitoring 
that is several years old—before new technology such as smartphones 
allowed for collection of more detailed and precise CSLI.168 
D. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach 
In United States v. Graham, two defendants were charged for a series 
of armed robberies in Baltimore, Maryland.169 The police obtained two 
Section 2703(d) court orders directing cell service providers to disclose 
221 days of historical CSLI.170 The cell service providers complied with 
the order, revealing 29,659 location data points for defendant Graham and 
28,410 for his co-defendant Jordan.171 Unlike the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, the United States Fourth Circuit held that the government’s 
warrantless procurement of CSLI amounted to an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.172 The court classified this practice as 
a Fourth Amendment search because examination of a person’s CSLI 
enables the government to track the movements of a cell phone and thus 
its user across public and private spaces and to discover the user’s private 
activities and personal habits.173 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
referenced both the third-party doctrine and the GPS tracking cases. 
The court analogized examination of historical CSLI to GPS tracking, 
reasoning that like the searches in Karo and Kyllo, CSLI allows the 
government to place individuals and their personal property—their cell 
phones—at their homes and other private locations at specific points in 
time.174 The court emphasized that unlike the single instances in Karo and 
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Kyllo, 221 days of CSLI could likely place each defendant at home on not 
one, but several occasions.175 The court further explained that the Supreme 
Court in Karo and Kyllo recognized the location of individuals and their 
property within a particular time as “critical” private details protected from 
the government’s intrusive use of technology.176 
Although extended CSLI monitoring is likely to place an individual in 
private locations on various occasions, this scenario does not always 
occur. For instance, if a cell phone is turned off or makes few or no 
connections to the network, the likelihood of private details being revealed 
is lower. Recognizing this possibility, the court emphasized that “the 
government cannot know in advance of obtaining CSLI exactly how 
revealing it will be or whether it will detail the cell phone user’s 
movements in private spaces.”177 The Fourth Circuit also rejected the 
district court’s assertion that CSLI is insufficiently precise in identifying 
locations to invade a reasonable privacy expectation.178 The court stressed 
that cell service providers are improving their networks by installing 
lower-power cell towers that are capable of covering areas as small as 40 
feet,179 and when analyzing issues involving CSLI, courts must take such 
technological developments into account.180 
The Graham court adopted a forward-looking approach that considers 
the increasing precision that CSLI continues to provide. Decisions in 
which holdings are limited to only the specific facts and technology before 
the court are less able to account for the current state of CSLI tracking, 
which is detailed, easily accessible to law enforcement, and increasingly 
precise.181 By recognizing the intense competition among cell service 
providers and the likelihood of continuing use of small cells, the Fourth 
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Circuit provides an accurate analysis of the effects of warrantless CSLI 
collection on individuals today.182 
Finding that cell phone users do not convey their CSLI to cell service 
providers at all, voluntarily or otherwise, the court rejected the third-party 
doctrine as inapplicable to CSLI.183 The court framed the relevant CSLI 
inquiry not as whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a third party’s records, but rather as whether an expectation of 
privacy in an individual’s locations and movements over time is 
reasonable.184 Because the specificity with which CSLI identifies cell sites 
allows users’ locations to be tracked raises privacy concerns,185 the court 
found the pertinent question to be whether users are generally aware of 
which specific cell sites are utilized when their phones connect to the 
network.186 Finding that overall, cell phone users do not know which 
particular cell site transmits their communications or even the general 
location of nearby cells sites, cell phone users do not and cannot 
voluntarily convey information to their service provider.187 
The federal circuit court opinions leave several questions critical to 
resolving the CSLI debate unanswered. One question is whether cell phone 
users forfeit any legitimate expectation of privacy in their CSLI when 
using a cell phone because of the third-party doctrine.188 Conversely, the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test could preserve cell phone 
users’ privacy interest in CSLI, regardless of a third party, such as a cell 
service provider ultimately possessing the CSLI.189 The issues of whether 
advances in cellular technology have altered societal privacy 
expectations190 and whether courts and legislatures ought to consider the 
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strong likelihood of future technological advances when articulating these 
modern privacy expectations also remains unclear.191 This remaining 
uncertainty can be attributed at least in part to the limited holdings that 
every circuit court has issued. As CSLI challenges surface in lower-level 
state courts, however, states are beginning to articulate their own CSLI 
standards of proof and rationales. 
III. STATES ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CSLI CONTROVERSY 
As state courts began ruling on governmental access to CSLI, a divide 
similar to that of federal courts has emerged over whether privacy 
protections for CSLI should be afforded to individuals.192 Some states 
have relied on their state constitutions, which provide greater privacy 
protections than the Fourth Amendment, to afford additional protections 
to their citizens.193 Other states have enacted their own state versions of 
the ECPA, which explicitly require a warrant for CSLI, and more states 
are debating similar action.194 Unfortunately, both the Louisiana judiciary 
and legislature have neglected to react to privacy concerns in the active 
manner that other states have. Instead, Louisiana has left its citizens 
vulnerable to privacy threats by maintaining a low standard for law 
enforcement to obtain CSLI. 
A. CSLI Standards Applicable in Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in several states have recognized a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI and have held that a warrant based on probable cause is 
the appropriate standard.195 The highest state courts in Massachusetts and 
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New Jersey relied on their respective state constitutions to afford these greater 
privacy protections.196 These courts have recognized the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the increasing level of detailed information that cell 
phones can reveal about an individual’s personal life and the indispensable 
nature of cell phones in modern society.197 Consequently, both states’ courts 
have held that the police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before 
obtaining CSLI unless they have met an exception to the warrant 
requirement.198 Both courts viewed the use of CSLI as a way of effectively 
transforming a cell phone into a GPS tracking device because the information 
that both convey allows an individual’s daily movements to be tracked and 
disclosed.199 The courts also rejected the third-party doctrine approach, noting 
that CSLI is not a voluntary disclosure because cell phone users do not take 
any affirmative or overt action to convey their CSLI to cell service 
providers.200 Users can avoid conveying location information only at the price 
of not using a cell phone, which has become a personal and professional 
necessity for the majority of the population.201 In both cases, however, the 
courts were careful to restrict their holdings squarely within the confines of 
their state constitutions and declined to extend their holdings to the Fourth 
Amendment.202 
Some state legislatures have passed legislation governing CSLI 
disclosure procedures to actively protect CLSI private interest. In 2013, 
Montana became the first state to enact legislation that requires law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant to access CSLI.203 The law is comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
Amendment in recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI. 152 So. 
3d at 510–11. 
 196. Earls, 70 A.3d at 644; Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *2. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Earls, 70 A.3d at 644; Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *7. 
 199. Earls, 70 A.3d at 642; Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *2. 
 200. Earls, 70 A.3d at 643; Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *6. 
 201. Earls, 70 A.3d at 643; Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *6. 
 202. Earls, 70 A.3d at 644; Wyatt. 2012 WL 4815307 at *2. Article I, 
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution states: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon 
probable cause.” N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7. Article XIV of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights provides: “Every subject has a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all 
his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or 
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation.” MASS. 
CONST. art. XIV. 
 203. Wackman, supra note 11, at 316. 
168 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
for several reasons. One is that it establishes a clear burden of proof.204 
Another is that the law enumerates various circumstances in which the 
government’s failure to obtain a search warrant will be justified, such as 
when a cell phone is reported stolen by the owner, when the government 
responds to a cell phone user’s call for emergency services, and when a 
life-threating situation exists.205 The law establishes bright-line rules for 
situations in which law enforcement obtains CSLI without a warrant and 
no warrant exceptions apply. In these scenarios, the law prohibits CSLI 
from being “used in an affidavit of probable cause in an effort to obtain a 
search warrant,” and it will not be admissible “in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding.”206 The violator is also assessed a civil fine.207 
Several other states have followed Montana’s example by passing similar 
legislation.208 Over a dozen other state legislatures, including Louisiana’s 
neighbor, Texas, have taken strides toward updating their laws to require 
warrants for CSLI.209 The recent legislative movement among state 
legislatures further supports the notion that societal privacy expectations 
are evolving to include interests in keeping CSLI confidential.210 
B. The Lack of a Clear Standard in Louisiana 
Although many other states have reevaluated privacy interests in light 
of technological advancements, Louisiana has not. Louisiana law 
enforcement practices pose an even greater threat to privacy interests than 
the procedures that the SCA outlines because law enforcement routinely 
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accesses CSLI with ordinary subpoenas.211 To obtain CSLI under the 
subpoena standard, Louisiana law enforcement need show only that the 
information it seeks is relevant or necessary to the case.212 Prosecutors 
frequently use subpoenaed CSLI as evidence to convict defendants.213 
Louisiana courts consistently allow CSLI to be admitted into evidence, 
but rarely give consideration about whether such a low standard of proof is 
an unlawful violation of Louisiana citizens’ privacy rights and interests.214 
In State v. Marinello,215 the defendant objected to the introduction of his cell 
phone records into evidence because the state should have been required to 
obtain a warrant for the records, rather than use a subpoena.216 The court 
quickly dismissed this argument, however, and held that the subpoena was 
sufficient.217 Because the records were kept in the cell service provider’s 
ordinary course of business for billing and troubleshooting purposes, and 
because the data was limited to historical CSLI, the records implicated 
neither Fourth Amendment privacy protections nor Louisiana Constitution 
Article 1, Section 5 privacy protections.218 
The defendant in Marinello also advanced a statutory law based 
argument, which the court rejected. Specifically, the defendant argued that 
the Louisiana Pen Register Statutes required the state to apply for the 
information.219 Citing to Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 15:1302(15), 
the court ruled that the Pen Register statute specifically excludes CSLI.220 
Louisiana’s Pen Register and Trap and Trace statutes provide that law 
enforcement may apply for a court order authorizing the use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device upon certification that “the information sought is 
relevant to an ongoing felony criminal investigation” and a recital of “facts 
or information constituting the reasonable suspicion upon which the 
application is based.”221 On its face, the Louisiana version of the Pen 
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Register statute appears to govern real-time CSLI in the same way that the 
federal Pen Register statute does. The Marinello opinion, however, suggests 
that the Louisiana Pen Register statute is wholly inapplicable to CSLI because 
of Louisiana Revised Statute Section 15:1302(15), which defines the term 
“pen register” for the chapter’s purposes. The revised statute excludes from 
the meaning of “pen register” devices that a cell service provider uses “in the 
ordinary course of the provider’s . . . business” for purposes including “billing 
or recording as an incident to billing for communications services” or “other 
ordinary business purposes.”222 Because cell towers generate cell tower 
records, which a cell service provider uses in the ordinary course of its 
business, the Marinello court concluded that CSLI does not fall within the 
ambit of the Louisiana Pen Register statute.223 
The ease with which law enforcement accesses and utilizes CSLI to 
generate detailed accounts of a person’s movements over time poses a 
serious threat to personal privacy. Knowing a person’s location over time 
reveals who individuals are and what they value.224 Furthermore, this 
investigation occurs without alerting individuals that law enforcement is 
tracking them. The Louisiana courts’ reluctance to fully address CSLI 
privacy concerns coupled with the lack of clear legislative guidelines 
governing compelled CSLI disclosure has resulted in an unclear area of 
the law that fails to adequately protect the privacy interests of Louisiana 
citizens. 
IV. SOLVING THE LOUISIANA CSLI PROBLEM 
Current Louisiana statutory law sets a low standard for law enforcement 
to obtain CSLI.225 Dramatic technological advances, particularly in the 
context of cellular technology, have resulted in an evolution of societal 
privacy expectations, which include privacy interests in the locations 
individuals visit, those with whom individuals associate, and other personal 
activities, regardless of the decision to carry a smartphone.226 Louisiana 
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law should also advance to provide adequate protections for these recently 
emerging privacy interests, and both the Louisiana courts and the 
Louisiana legislature have a role to play in ensuring this change. 
A. Expansive Constitutional Interpretation 
Similar to the superior courts in New Jersey and Massachusetts, 
Louisiana courts should interpret the Louisiana Constitution to provide a 
greater level of CSLI privacy protections to Louisiana citizens. Article 1, 
Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution offers greater privacy protections 
than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it 
incorporates language that supplies a separate right of privacy, as well as 
an express protection of property, communications, houses, papers, and 
effects.227 The drafters knowingly and intentionally incorporated this 
language in an effort to make the Louisiana Constitution more expansive 
than the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.228 As a result of 
this additional language, “[t]he traditional guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is cemented and expanded.”229 Thus, based on the 
additional language in Article 1, Section 5, constitutional interpretations 
providing for greater privacy protections are not only plausible, but also 
were intended by the drafters. 
One interpretation of the Louisiana Constitution that Louisiana courts 
should adopt to provide privacy protections for CSLI focuses on the 
language in Article 1, Section 5 that grants an affirmative right to privacy. 
Professor Lee Hargrave, principal architect of the Louisiana Constitution 
and author of The Louisiana Constitution: A Reference Guide,230 explained 
that the “key element” of this right to privacy is that “the invasions of 
privacy must be unreasonable to merit constitutional protection.”231 In 
evaluating the reasonableness of a particular privacy invasion, courts are 
given “flexibility to determine which invasions of privacy are supported 
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by sufficient societal interests to be considered reasonable.”232 “[T]he purpose 
of the convention in expanding the individual’s protections in this area beyond 
the existing law” guides this inquiry.233 The congressional debates 
surrounding Article 1, Section 5 at its enactment further support “a desire to 
go far beyond federal standards and to prevent the use of evidence obtained 
by private persons in violation of the guarantees of the section.”234 The 
purposeful enlargement of the exclusionary rule further supports the idea that 
the framers of Article 1, Section 5 intended to provide expansive privacy 
protections.235 
Individuals do not buy cell phones to use as tracking devices, nor do they 
reasonably expect that the government will use their cell phones in such a 
manner.236 Rather, cell phone users expect the freedom to move about in 
relative anonymity without the government keeping an individualized turn-
by-turn itinerary of their whereabouts.237 To safeguard privacy interests in the 
sum of an individual’s movements, Louisiana courts should adopt an 
expansive interpretation of Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. 
B. A Legislative Response  
The Louisiana legislature should be proactive in creating laws that protect 
Louisiana citizens’ privacy interests in CSLI. As Justice Alito suggests in his 
concurrence in Jones, the best solution to privacy concerns involving dramatic 
technological change is legislative.238 A legislative body is “well situated to 
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy 
and safety in a comprehensive way.”239 The Louisiana legislature is well 
suited to take action because the legislature is the governmental body most 
connected to Louisiana citizens. The Louisiana legislature can communicate 
directly with its constituents, seek input regarding public opinion of CSLI 
tracking, and then incorporate these views into its actions. If public opinion 
changes or CSLI technology advances further, the Louisiana legislature can 
respond quickly by conducting hearings and investigations and drafting new 
legislation.240 
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Louisiana needs a comprehensive statutory scheme to carve out specific 
exceptions to the warrant requirement and establish a clear suppression 
remedy. The lack of an adequate suppression remedy under Louisiana law or 
the SCA is problematic. Currently, if law enforcement collects CSLI under a 
flawed, conclusory, or false court order, no mechanism is in place to prevent 
this evidence from being used to prosecute a defendant.241 A specific, clear 
suppression remedy, similar to that set forth in Montana’s law, would 
discourage the prosecutor’s use of tainted CSLI evidence. 
A clear, straightforward statute with easily administrable standards and 
clear guidelines also benefits law enforcement because in the midst of high-
stakes investigations, an easily understandable statute is likely to deter 
mistakes or abuse by law enforcement.242 The benefit of placing the decisional 
authority in a neutral, detached magistrate would also alleviate concerns about 
police abuse of CSLI practices. A detached magistrate’s scrutiny is a more 
reliable safeguard than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 
“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fettering out crime.”243 
Moreover, such legislation would be consistent with the expansive 
constitutional interpretation of Article 1, Section 5. Law enforcement, as well 
as society in general, has a strong interest in the prompt apprehension of 
suspects,244 especially in a way that responsibly allocates scarce investigative 
resources.245 Citizens have a competing interest, however, in being free from 
intrusive CSLI investigative techniques that can reveal their private 
information when law enforcement’s suspicion of their involvement in 
criminal activity fails to meet probable cause.246 Cell phone users are common 
today, but individuals generally do not purchase cell phones believing that 
doing so automatically provides law enforcement with ample opportunity to 
compile a comprehensive record of their personal habits.247 Conditioning the 
use of a cell phone, which has become a necessity to many Americans, on 
individuals’ willingness to permit the government to track their movements 
without probable cause is also unreasonable.248 
Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, requiring law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before obtaining 
CSLI would likely burden law enforcement to a minimal degree. The benefits 
of adopting this practice, however, such as an increase of public trust, would 
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outweigh the slight inconvenience the warrant requirement may impose on 
law enforcement.249 Therefore, a comprehensive statutory scheme requiring a 
warrant based on a showing of probable cause and other attributes would 
effectively balance Louisiana citizens’ privacy rights, public safety, and 
security.250 
CONCLUSION 
Cellular technology has advanced to a level that allows for CSLI tracking 
with nearly the precision of a GPS. As cell service providers continue 
competing to provide the most reliable and capable cellular networks for their 
subscribers, CSLI will continue to advance. CSLI will become more precise 
and thus more valuable to prosecutors and, more importantly, more 
convincing for juries. The prosecutorial value of CSLI underscores the 
importance of implementing warrant requirements, which will insulate CSLI 
evidence from police abuse. High-stakes criminal investigations in which 
investigators and prosecutors who use CSLI are under significant pressure to 
close cases are precisely the circumstances in which judicial oversight and 
legislative clarity are most needed.251 Current federal and Louisiana law 
governing CSLI are inadequate to confront this reality. 
In today’s world, the wish to keep their movements private leaves 
Louisiana citizens who desire and need to stay connected and informed with 
no option other than to forego cellular technology altogether.252 Louisiana 
courts’ expansive interpretation of the constitution to provide for additional 
CSLI privacy protections is imperative. Equally important is the Louisiana 
legislature’s creation of a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the 
specifics of CSLI, from the burden of proof required to the consequences 
resulting from failure to comply with that burden. This constitutional and 
statutory probable cause solution will protect the privacy rights of Louisiana 
citizens and provide clear guidelines to law enforcement without hindering its 
ability to investigate and prosecute violations of the law effectively. 
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